The debt was to be transfered to pundits who peg the prospects of the new enterprise promising, and are thus tempted to trade their treasure for the new shares. But the initial phase of the public presentation has sputtered . The underwriters must make the most of the new shares, and manipulate the market as they may.

Like Atlas, the Greek god who gyrates the globe, the underwriters must support the shares they bought by buying more on the market, once they are traded. They have already made a large investment, though through tight teeth, and this is sure to swell. Any surrender by sick subscribers must be swallowed. If sufficient shareholders subsequently sell their shares, showing preference for their purchase money back, the underwriters could end up sole owners of Time.com.

That is not as planned. It was known that the amount required was large, amounting to the total value of shares traded for ten or more days on the Kuala Lumpur stock exchange. The underwriters took a calculated risk, and the game has now gone against them. Theirs is the uncomfortable condition of coddling Time.com through puberty, investing much more in management and marketing than mentioned in previous early stages of parenthood.

The issuing conglomerate has already received all the underwriting proceeds, less fees and commissions, though there may or may not be recourse if further deterioration develops. For the moment, the deed is done, the corporate debt is delay-fused. The consortium of lenders has effectively made a loan without interest, and the shares have become collateral for that loan. Not a banker's dream. The value of the shares, if marked to market, will determine the net tangible assets of the members of the underwriting consortium. They will want to keep the market value high, even if it means making purchases to prop the position at the close of each trading day.

The problem with their position is that it is too transparent to be tolerated. Traders, aware of their vulnerability, will buy the shares whenever they drift below the observed support level and then offer them for sale toward the end of the day. The consortium members will thus find themselves in a pickle, always forced to support the stock until all the shares are sold to other buyers at cost or above. This may take a number of years, given the size of the offering, and in the meantime, there will be numerous other opportunities which must be missed, because funds are already tied up.

Money stored in stale stock sours. It finally fuels financial gridlock. When money cannot move freely, the effect is to inhibit all business activity in general. These are called "tight money" times. The gridlock effect is used as a brake by central banks to dampen excessive spending and to curtail capital investment in boom times. The central bank does this by raising the interest rate. Alternatively, the central bank attempts to relieve financial gridlock by lowering the interest rate to stimulate borrowing and consumer spending.

Unfortunately, monetary fiscal control does not always work. Japan is experiencing a period of low or negative growth, in spite of a zero interest rate policy. Loans are not being paid, and the banks must constantly seek sources of new money to lend at no interest. People who deposit their money in a bank expect some return, in the form of interest, and this is difficult when the lending rate is zero. It is not fun to be a bank in Japan today.

In Malaysia the problem facing the Time.com underwriters illustrates the mess the whole country must master. It is not unique to Malaysia, and is compounded by Malaysia's dependence on exports to other countries also struggling with massive debt. This inter-relationship means Malaysia is not in complete control if its own future.

The many Malaysian public funds have invested heavily in the stocks and bonds of listed companies, and thus they must continue to give support to prevent serious losses which will appear on their books if and when they are marked to the market. The fund purchases appear at the end of each day, supporting the KLCI, and giving an appealing appearance of apparent stability. This activity tends to tie up the cash of the funds, and they need new deposits to maintain their market activity. The high savings rate of the thrifty people, who deposit in the local savings funds, is a significant factor. Their savings, translated into fund buying, is one arm of the Atlas that holds the market up.

The other arm is the finance ministry. The faulty and failing privatisation schemes have required massive injections of government funds. A major source of funding has come from the national oil company, Petronas, which now effectively owns the shipping company, MISC, and Proton, the national car manufacturer. The chairman of Petronas has now been named to manage the national airline, MAS, and since Petronas is controlled through the finance minister's office also, the picture becomes more and more clear.

Other major corporations are also managed, directly or indirectly, by the ministry of finance. These include the nation-wide utilities, Tenaga (electricity), Telecom (telephone), and the various railroad and local transit agencies. The major highways are all toll roads, and their operation is regulated by the transport ministry, with the financial aspects controlled through the finance ministry.

Malaysia is often offered as a showcase for developing countries, and the prime minister is touted as the mastermind behind the development. What is not mentioned is the oil money. Other developing countries must make do without this bounty. The nagging question is the efficiency with which the money has been spent. It is easy to spend extra money. What is difficult is to spend money well. Many Malaysian ministers live in mansions with a lavish lifestyle.

The present economic climate suggests a period of prudence is more than just a practical path, as more deficit spending is certain to be required to stave off economic stagnation. The debt is there, for which interest must be paid, and there is new debt to come. As in the Time.com case, the debt is not being paid, but merely shuffled about. There is more juggling onstage than any act of substance. The globe goes to and fro, snow-balling all the time. This is seen in the MAS bailout-buyback, the LRT un-privatisation, and the large debts of the state governments.

The worry is that Atlas is tiring. And this at a time the whole world grows weary with debt. The Malaysian mega-projects continue as before, but the financiers neither falter nor faint. The funds continue in their patriotic duty of market support, though not reporting their activities to their public, and not marking their position to the market each day. The finance ministry assumes more and more government debt, through large projects, government bonds, and a salvation corps of national bad-loan-buckets known as Danaharta, Danamodal and a corporate restructuring agency.

The Time.com IPO is all a part of the picture, and has turned out to be a bigger bite than the system can smoothly digest. After such a meal, perhaps the time has come for a rest.