Systems are man's tools suitably extended. As such, like all technology, they challenge first our ingenuity, our engineering, and then our spirit. Systems begin as pure abstractions, and only over time become physical reality. Bringing the abstraction to its final concretion, in the form of machines and buildings, may be thought of as the hardware phase of system design and construction. Scientists, engineers and contractors provide this part of the system.

Once a well-designed system is in place, it should operate without flaw. The tuning process takes time and training, because there is almost always some human factor. Humans, as a form of software, are less reliable than hardware, and are subject to numerous motivations that mechanisms are free of. In general, humans, as the software part of a system, are the less desirable and less reliable components. Removing the human factor removes the unreliability, but also eliminates any chance for spiritual guidance and control. Technology devoid of spiritual input has become a threat, and it is yet to be known if our spiritual development can accelerate to prevent extinction at our own hands.

A good example of a complex system in operation may be seen at the new Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA), where there is an automatic shuttle train that carries passengers between two major terminals. The shuttle train operation is fully automatic. It stops at each end of the track with smooth braking. The doors open and close without human attention. There is no operator to be seen. Day after day, the shuttle performs as part of a large and complex people-mover system.

Planes today tend to be large, and carry as many as 500 people. The arriving passengers get off the plane, walk into the terminal and ride the shuttle to the moving baggage carousel where they hope to find their stowed luggage. Then they go out past the customs bench to the arrival hall in search of street transportation to take them to their final destination. Up to this point, the KLIA people-mover system works as well as anywhere in the world.

The arrival dock, however, is a rate-limiting step in the overall operation. The passengers find that street transportation is often not available. There are no taxi's and there are no buses. There is a counter where coupons are sold for a limousine that will take them to town. But after the coupon is bought, there is no limousine. Instead there is a queue, often a long one. The wait for a taxi can be long. Two hours plus is not unusual. The long wait for a taxi to take one to town is memorable. It is something to tell your friends about when you get home.

One wonders what went wrong. The terminal itself is large and durable. It is wonderfully built of glass and stainless steel tubing. The marble floors are impressive, though not so welcoming and comfortable after the quiet carpets of Singapore. It has a clean and sterile look, utilitarian, and performs its function well. It gives a feeling of moving about inside a large tower clock, augmented by glass-walled lifts floating flawlessly floor-to-floor, silent doors sliding apart to allow exit at either side. Claustrophobia is impossible.

The arrival hall, coming just outside the baggage carousel area, is alike tall and wide. There is plenty of room to move across to the loading dock. The dock itself is wide and dry, with umbrella webs spreading over the spacious lanes. The hardware is in place. But the lanes are empty. There are no taxi's, no buses. The queue of baggage-laden passengers is long. It is clear that there is a software shortage somewhere.

The original plan provided for a monopoly, a limousine service to provide taxi service from the arrival dock to town. A company was formed and given an exclusive right to operate along the arrival dock. Autos were bought and painted. Drivers were hired. The drivers drove the limousines to the arrival dock and loaded the passengers, who gave the driver a coupon pre-purchased at the arrival hall counter. The limousines carrying passengers and baggage moved smartly away, taking the new super-highway to town. But there were many periods when there were more taxi's than people, and other periods when there were more people than taxi's.

At times drivers had to wait long hours for people, and sometimes people had to wait long hours for taxi's. Both were disgruntled. The passengers complained. The drivers quit. There were conferences, promises of improvement. New procedures were developed, with more cars, more drivers, improved communication. Still the problem persisted. Month after month the problem persisted. The passengers still had to wait. The monopoly was first threatened, then it was removed.

Competition, in the form of city taxi's, was allowed. The cozy limousine monopoly objected, but the government decision was final; city taxi's were allowed to pick up arriving passengers at the arrival dock. But the limousine company fought back. Means were found to give preference to the limousines. The city taxi's first cried "No fair!" and finally gave up. Unfair competition is no competition.

The passengers still had to wait. They complained. There was another conference. It was announced city taxi's would have equitable access. A new procedure was agreed on to bring the waiting city taxi's and limousines from a nearby parking plaza to the arrival dock in turn as needed, called by a pair of radio-equipped dispatchers. The dispatchers were hired and supervised by the airport manager, who is responsible for the smooth operation of the terminal for the benefit of the traveling public.

But the dispatchers didn't play fair. They continued to sell limousine coupons for thirty minutes after the last limousine had departed. They didn't call the waiting city taxi's as agreed.

This meant that passengers who bought the limousine coupons were committed to a wait for the next limousine, however long that might be. They couldn't know that a short distance away in the parking plaza, city taxi's were available and awaiting their turn. But the city taxi's weren't called. Arriving limousines were allowed to go directly to the arrival dock, by-passing the parking plaza, and not required to join the city taxi queue. The city taxi's, noticing this, decided "to hell with it," abandoned the queue and drove back to town empty, just as they did when the limousine company was a protected monopoly.

Competition and parangs are both useful tools in the hands of a skilled practitioner. But competition, like the parang, can cause harm when used improperly. Fledgling industries often need some protection. But when the limousine monopoly failed to meet the needs of the airport transport system over a period of time, the monopoly protection was removed. Competition was allowed. Free enterprise was invited to address the problem of balancing supply and demand.

And for a while it worked well. The city taxi's were eager to get the business. They willingly circled back to the arrival dock after delivering their airport passengers to the departure doors, waited long intervals for their fair turn, and there was sufficient interest to meet the need. The passengers seldom had more than a short wait, even in the midnight-to-dawn slow period.

The airport management initially agreed to provide the city taxi's a separate booth in the arrival hall, constantly manned with trained personnel to give instructions to confused travelers. Large, readable signs were to be erected. After a two-week delay a miniscule counter, unmanned, and with no signs, was provided. The city cabs found this a poor performance.

The airport manager hired radio-equipped dispatchers, but the dispatchers favored the limousines. The passenger queues continued, and the city taxi's became discouraged. The problem festered. The continuing demand eventually brought supply from an unexpected quarter.

Entrepreneurs can smell opportunity, and they began to bring their private automobiles to the arrival dock under a pretense of picking up relatives. Touts, working independently inside the arrival hall, formed a mob beseeching the passengers to accept their services. On finding a customer, they guide them to any waiting car and load their luggage. In the absence of a meter or pre-arranged fare, abuses are rampant. Over-charged passengers become irate, and furiously complain.

The police have given tickets to the unlicensed private drivers, impounding the cars of several repeat offenders. The touts, however, are not molested, because they look just like waiting relatives, and thus can continue to bring passengers out to the curb, where entrepreneurs and city taxi drivers wait, willing to pay them a commission. The touts, on commission, constitute considerable competition for the dispatchers, since they can provide superior service by favoring the independent city taxi's, while the salaried dispatchers favor the limousines. The old monopoly thus fights back, struggling to survive in a free market, not averse to using unfair means.

The system continues to function, with planeloads of passengers arriving every hour. The economic drama at the arrival dock goes on. The old monopoly is seen scrambling to regain its prerogatives against the free enterprise system. The competition, motivated by a strong profit incentive, attempts to supply the demand, for the moment content with only the overflow.

Competition is a basic instrument in any free enterprise system, which operates to maximise return per unit of invested capital. It promotes efficiency. Monopoly seeks to provide needed services at a stipulated price over a contracted period, with a priority given to the service provided over profit.

Government gives the monopoly, and government takes it away. In the KLIA instance, government has favored the original company to which it gave a monopoly, recognising the large initial investment, and has only turned to competition as a last resort. In the daily battle on the arrival dock, the government is a distant observer, largely unaware, but with a large national tourist industry at risk.

In the present case, as in most others, the economic factors do not function in an environment totally free of government and political interests. KLIA thus makes a good case study for understanding the inter-twining of economics and politics.

The government may intervene to allow the city taxi's fair treatment, and freedom to fill the un-met need. This would obviate the existing opportunity now seized by independent unlicensed drivers and touts. Or there may be no further action by government at all, the situation allowed to eventually resolve itself as best it may. A new automatic shuttle train to KL is under construction, to be in operation within the next two years.

The airport management is certain to take further interest in the problem, responding to continuing complaints. The situation thus offers material for a detached academic analysis, giving instruction from a number of perspectives. The dispatchers scheme to avoid detection by the city taxi drivers. The limousine drivers take advantage when and as they can, constantly pressing for a higher wage.

In the meantime, the demand exceeds the supply, the touts are active, and unlicensed drivers risk impoundment of their cars. The city taxi drivers are disgusted with the unfair treatment, and now refuse to participate unless there is a loud request for immediate assistance.