When a word is used, its intended meaning is often revealed by the context in which it is used. The sound of the word on the ear may soothe the qualms and questions which arise regarding definition. The speaker is assumed to have an acceptable definition in mind, which may not be borne out be subsequent statements. As an example of the difficulty, let us take the word 'compassion'. It is classified as a noun, which means it is a person, place or thing. In the instance of compassion we easily eliminate the first two and concentrate on the third. If compassion is not a person or place, it must be a “thing.”

Now we may ask what sort of thing it is. A thing has a corporeal existence. That means it is concrete, capable of being detected by one or more of the five senses. Compassion does not fit this category, and thus we must re-examine it to see if perhaps there is an aspect of "thing" that has been overlooked.

If a discrete thing is not concrete, then it must be abstract. And there are any number of things that are indeed abstract, having no physical existence. These abstractions occur only in the mind of man. They are dangerous in that while they are readily constructed in the imagination, and said by the inventor to be real and dangerous, they are but a fiction. Fictions are dangerous. Men may be charged and convicted of fictitious crimes. History is full of instances. We must pay attention, and take care. There is danger; Socrates made the same point, and caused sufficient antagonsim to bring on his trial and conviction. His crime was to arouse suspicion of the undefined (and un-definable) abstraction.

Bravely, we must make a new category for those nouns without concrete form, those nouns which are but abstractions. If a thing is an abstraction, its existence is difficult to establish, as no physical evidence is available. This presents difficulties for the law, which requires both physical evidence and sharp definition. If compassion were to be made a crime, then a sharp definition would be required, and the evidence necessary to secure a conviction must be carefully presented to a panel of objective and sceptical reviewers.

Since compassion is a state of mind evidenced only by behaviour or conduct, then the identifying and characteristic behaviour and/or conduct must be carefully described. This is so the person accused of compassion can be charged, and the necessary behaviour and/or conduct can be the subject of testimony given in open court by competent witnesses who are sworn to tell the truth and only the truth about the matter. Their testimony may be refuted by the accused. The credibility of the witnesses may be impeached. Naturally the judges will require competence of the witnesses to recognise behaviour and/or conduct that betrays compasion. They must describe the actions of the accused that suggest compassion was actually witnessed.

Compassion, however, touches on motivation, on a psychological state of mind. Such things are difficult to judge, especially by those devoid of it or totally incapable of experiencing it first hand. Unfamiliarity with compassion is difficult to determine, and in the ordinary scheme of things anyone is allowed to give evidence. Perjury is difficult to detect when the charge is an abstraction. Innocence is also difficult to prove, as the alleged state of mind necessary for a conviction may be an endogenous trait of the accused incapable of disguise, yet not revealed in any overt act to be observed by witnesses.

Beyond the division of things into the concrete and the abstract, there are further difficulties to be discussed before the needs of justice may be met. There is the matter of generality and specificity, which makes the matter more messy in the mitreing and metering. We must first recognise that there is a general instance, apart from any specific person, place or time. It is perfectly acceptable to refer to the abstraction compassion in the general instance.

Within this general instance one finds all the possible ways compassion may be defined or evidenced by behaviour and/or conduct. This is a second use of the word. The particular instance is but one instance chosen from the general collection. The general instance is the larger collection of the particular behaviours and/or actions which may be described or defined, though in the particular instance we make the identification without attaching it to a particular person or place. So, we make this distinction, between compassion that is general in its scope and compassion that is particular, the second being delimited by exclusion of all but one of the numerous instances contained within the general case.

This dichotomy, interesting though it may be, does not conclude the analysis, for there are yet two further distinctions which must be made. That is because these two further distinctions are also a routine part of our everyday thought and speech, though usually not given the recognition they deserve.

The first of the two is the specific instance, in which the behaviour and/or conduct is said to be attached to a given individual, or a group of individuals. We specifically refer to the specific instance as the intended selection from the general collection, and attach it to an individual or group. It may even be applied to a larger, more nebulous collection of people, such as an organisation or a country.

The second distinction of the two has to do with a desirable property which distinguishes the behaviour and/or conduct as having a readily identifiable and widely agreed upon physical characteristic, such as harmony or shape, that allows it to be accepted by all as the ideal instance. Of all the shapes a given string may take, one of them may be accepted as the “ideal” instance. It may be the straight string, or the smoothly curved string. It may even be the special instance of the string without end, as a string made into a loop (such as a rubber band). Note that the string, if it is made of flexible material like the rubber band, may take an infinite number of forms, all meet the requirements of the circular pattern, but there may be departure from the plane and from a given length. The mutual acceptance of the ideal instance is critical.

The above word study, while elementary, does give some introduction to the problem mankind faces in finding and punishing the terrorist, the terrorist organisation, and the terrorist government. Those who support or sympathise with the aims of the terrorist also need an identifying definiton. An international criminal code is required that defines the terrorist and those organisations that advocate and conspire to use violence in pursuit of political objectives. It is essential as a prelude to finding an acceptable method of bringing justice in a murky area of the law. Terrorism is an abstraction that arises from a concrete activity that is objectionable and actionable. It is akin to undeclared war, and is criminal in nature and scope. The terms innocent and guilty are now more elusive. Mankind must be careful that action taken to save the world for the peaceful and the just do not also destroy the mechanism by which these ends are met.