Perhaps there is an unseen threat. Considering the expense involved in the purchase and maintenance of a submarine, the public takes an interest in the reasoning which supports this decision.

A review of the facts regarding submarine operations is pertinent to the analysis. Everyone knows that submarines were widely used, and successfully so, by the Germans in WWI and WWII to direct torpedoes into passenger and merchant vessels. On rare occassions a warship was sunk. These activities were not deemed to be defensive in nature. Perhaps Malaysia has a new definition of "defensive".

It is obvious now that submarines can go under the water. Usually they come back up. But not always. There is a risk that each dive will be the last. The success of each up-down cycle depends on the training of the crew and the careful attention to details such as closing the hatch and having valves that can close against sea pressure.

Assuming that the submarine dives without rolling over [there is some risk of that], then it finds itself blind in a hazardous environment. What does one do next? Typically the periscope is raised and a sweep around is made to assure that all is well and nobody has been left topside. The periscope does not extend much above the water, however, and the view is very limited. The submerged submarine is thus not an excellent observation platform, though a very expensive one.

If the water is sufficiently deep and the bottom smooth the submarine may descend until the keel is fifty to a hundred feet above the sea floor. Submarines can operate safely down to the design depth, which is typically between three hundred and one thousand feet. In murky water the submarine is not visible from the air once the main hull is covered by about a hundred feet of water. In clear water, such as the South China Sea, the submarine is visible from a plane or satellite to its test depth.

The value of a submarine to escape detection is thus lost, and its ability to creep undetected within striking distance of an unsuspecting passenger liner or fishing boat is questionable. Only a large, slow vessel makes a good target, because torpedoes can run under a shallow draft vessel without exploding, and a fast moving vessel can take evasive maneuvers. Because the submarine is readily detectable with modern techniques it is a simple matter to destroy it and the crew with little bother and less expense.

The investment in a submarine, with the necessary training facility to support it, the parts requirements, the necessity for a proper submarine base with complete repair shops is a relatively large expense for a small country. Therefore the anticipated need for this strategic development by the admirals of the RMN is of interest.

May one ask just what the submarine is to defend us against? If the Russian Navy, with decades of experience, cannot operate a submarine without loss of the vessel and crew, what are the odds that Malaysia is getting into something far beyond its capability, Malaysia Boleh to the contrary. If no convincing argument can be made for this venture, in the light of the Russian tragedy, one must seriously question the mentality and/or motivation of the defense minister.

Perhaps the submarine is to be used against pirates. But no, the pirates are mainly in the Malacca Straits, and the submarine is to be used in the Eastern waters, so that can't be it. Submarines are very poor vessels for anti-piracy operations.

Indonesia has issued a stern warning to Singapore not to allow its new submarines to stray beyond the narrow lanes of the local waterways. Our submarine would have to share these narrow lanes with both the ship traffic and the Singapore subs. The chances for a collision are therefore much greater than moving around in the open sea. This is especially true when there is shallow draft and many reefs to avoid. A submarine has difficulty in such waters because when submerged it cannot detect these dangerous areas.

Apart from the risk of collision, there is the unnecessary risk of an international incident, either from accidental intrusion into the coastal waters of a neighboring country or unintentional interference in the naval maneuvers of other countries.

The presence of a submarine operated by Malaysians cannot make international marine captains feel safer. On the contrary, they may feel a threat, either of a collision or an inadvertent attack during periods of tension.

Considering the initial and ongoing expense, the lack of showing of any strategic need, the lack of training or instructors locally, the total inexperience, the potential for disaster, collision in these tight waters, the potential for international misunderstandings, and the lack of any perceived threat,
all-in-all the purchase of a submarine seems a foolish waste of increasingly scarce money.