March 26, 2003
The first Gulf War ended after 100 hours, having reached the limits of its UN mandate. Gulf War II now exceeds that, and everyone wonders when it will end. For any hope of an answer, the broader question must be narrowed. Will it 'end' when the last US, British and Australian soldier has left the country? Will it 'end' when the last aircraft carrier leaves the Persian Gulf? Will it 'end' when an official UN administration has accepted control and takes responsibility for Iraq's institutions? No matter which alternative one chooses, the 'end' will be a long time in coming.
If all US objectives are met, whatever the final stages reveal them to be, will all US-British-Australian troops embark for home? Until the objectives of the invaders become clear, it is difficult for anyone to estimate how long the hostilities will last. We can assume, based on Bush's statements, that the invasion will proceed until all of Iraq is completely under US control. Perhaps then the shooting war will stop, followed by a benevolent occupation to install freedom, democracy and a government with a favorable oil policy toward the US, Britain, Australia, and Israel. Water, food, electricity and medical supplies for the population are promised as well.
An estimate of the time required for an end to active hostilities is made difficult by the extraordinary flexibility exhibited by the two combatants. The nature of the Iraq war is in daily transition, from a more traditional type, where two conventional armies vie front-to-front for disputed the territory, into a lop-sided, sporadic shootout reminiscent of guerrilla warfare that occurs the world over.
If the Iraqi army joins in a big pitched battle, it is possible the end might come in a matter of weeks. We were told to expect a conclusion in days, then weeks, and now the projection is for a long, tough campaign. We are daily assured that the end will soon arrive, and the outcome will certainly be a complete sweep for the invaders. This now appears a less likely outcome. Looking back at the first five days of the war, one sees fewer prospects for a completely satisfactory victory for the US side.
Things have now become murky, and one would like to get a clearer picture. But how can this be done? Fortunately, here is a way. An analysis can be made that is primarily based on geometrical considerations, and this approach suggests the engagement will continue in a variety of forms indefinitely ... to the consternation and frustration of the present US administration.
Geometry may seem a strange starting point in looking for an answer to the question of when the war will end. Surprisingly, it is a very good place to start, and the geometrical analysis concludes by telling us the Iraq war will continue into the indefinite future. Said another way, the Iraq war has no foreseeable end, the termination date is open-ended, and may be expected to continue on and on into the coming decades and perhaps centuries.
This is not the politically correct answer. Depending on your degree of interest in how geometry can predict an unexpected outcome, you perhaps might consider a departure from this web site now, as what follows may prove tiresome, if not irksome.
Since you have elected to stay, let me say a brief word in defense of geometry. Some say absolute truth is a myth, and that it is foolish to pretend that such certainty as geometry offers is impossible. Everything is relative, so the argument goes, and this is perhaps the case in most areas of human affairs. However, I submit to you that this does not apply to geometry. There are indeed basic geometrical truths, and they may be applied with logical rigor in all circumstances. An ignorance of the power of geometry to provide logical truth is tantamount to an invitation to folly. A willing disregard of its exactitude condemns one to perpetual uncertainty. Further, if accompanied with a prideful and self-righteous arrogance, the total disregard of geometry guarantees the failure of an ambitious enterprise.
Plato's school in Athens, the Academy, lasted for nine hundred years. Over the entrance he inscribed, "Let none enter here who are ignorant of geometry." Geometry was considered a prerequisite for further learning; it formed the logical foundation upon which subsequent mental development was supported.
You may wonder how geometry can assist in making an accurate projection regarding the length of a war with such certainty. Numerous demonstrations in answer are possible, but our immediate concern is not in teaching a generalised geometry. It is perhaps enough, for the moment, to provide only one example of the power of geometry. If it helps us to see the situation in Iraq with greater clarity, giving us some idea of the future, that will suffice.
Consider the relationship between the area of a territory and the length of its periphery. Without introducing the mathematical formulas that allow an exact calculation, it is intuitively clear that as the area of a territory increases, so does the length of its perimeter. An area to be defended against a ground invader(s) is vulnerable along its border. The shorter the border is, the fewer men are required to defend it. The optimal relationship between area and perimeter occurs in the case of the circle, because a circular territory has the shortest border. The poorest ratio occurs where the territory is long and narrow, with borders that are irregular.
We may apply this basic truth to a war in which A has a conventional army, modern in all respects, and invades the territory of B, having a poorly equipped army. To all appearance the suprior modern army has a great advantage, with the expectation the weaker force will soon be overwhelmed. Such is the conventional expectation, and it is always a surprise when the outcome favours the underdog.
The war against terrorism is such a guerrilla war, and it is being fought in a conventional manner, through conquest and dominion over people, resources, and territory. The strategy of the US war on terror is based on the belief that if the guerrillas are denied a place to live, and are not allowed any freedom of movement or communication, they will be suppressed to the point of impotence.
The conventional war against terrorism is primarily of a conventional style, using force to kill the opponent, and taking physical possession of his territory. Those defenders not killed in the invasion arecaptured and incarcerated for as long as they are considered a potential threat if freed. The consequence of such a strategy is that an occupying force must thereafter defend the territory indefinitely.
If the inhabitants are driven back from their borders by force, but are still present and free to move about within the borders of the now conquered and controlled area, then an ability to identify potential combatants among the citizenry is absolutely necessary. If all the indigenous inhabitants have a roughly similar appearance, and there is no apparent means to distinguish a combatant from a non-combatant, then the army has not been defeated. It is still intact, only forced into a more surreptitious form of combat. The members of the army now become a loose guerrilla band, with the least necessary organisational structure. They have the advantage of choosing the time and place to strike, using whatever tactics and weapons are available. They generally do not attempt to hold territory, since to do so creates a front that invites massive retaliation. The essence of guerrilla warfare is surprise and mobility, leaving the expensive defense of territory to the invader.
A conventional army, seeking to conquer and occupy a given area, has a two-fold task. It must protect the borders of the conquered territory from an attack by foreign elements, and it must defend itself inside the borders from the counterattacks of the local guerrilla forces. History tells us this is a difficult dual task, and success usually proves to be impossible. The conflict in Vietnam offers valuable lessons, as does the continuing situation in Afghanistan.
The Russians have acquired a difficult and expensive education from their experiences in Afghanistan. The US administration, along with its British and Australian partners, is still struggling with the basic concepts, blinded by a thirst for Middle Eastern oil, and having an unfortunate faith in Israeli fealty.
There is an interesting twist to the Iraqi scenario, in that there are ethnic and religious pressures that threaten to divide the country. If this occurs, it effectively compounds the problem, because it greatly increases the length of the borders to be defended, while the territory inside the original border remains constant.
When there are hostile indigenous defenders who are armed and free to maneuver inside the conquered area, they must be identified and eliminated, either by killing, incarcerating or moving them to another territory where they can be controlled. The problem of how to most humanely carry out this tactic has been the dilemma of all colonial powers, and is also seen in the case of Israel, fighting a guerrilla war against the indigenous Palestinians after fifty years. The colonial powers often solve the impasse by establishing a servile civil service composed of locals, and supervising them with vigilance and vigour.
The indigenous people thus do not see the members of the colonial administration, who remain behind the scenes out of sight. All confrontations by locals with administration bureaucrats are with locals, and by this means the conquerers are able to avoid open confrontations with locals that may generate resentment. The British are expert at such subversion of local governments, substituting in place of the invading army a new professional colonial army and police force that specialises in the recruitment and training of locals. A British officer force is kept over the local officers, supplied by the London Colonial Office. By this means a small force can control and dominate a country of many millions. At no time were there over a hundred thousand British soldiers, civil servants and private citizens in India.
A few regiments of the regular British army are sufficient to maintain permanent and continuing control, often in a conspiracy with the local potentate, who lives under the threat of a cannon, with only a mutiny here and there, now and again, that he then puts down with a ruthless demonstration of force. The United States is reluctant to embark on such an of overt colonialism, preferring instead to introduce a brand of representative democracy with its three-balanced-houses style of government. Unfortunately, there is no country in which this has been completely successful, because the process requires a forgiveness of the brutalities committed during the conquest, and this is seldom forthcoming, even after many generations.
The war in Iraq, though initially it appeared to be a contest between conventional forces, is certain to be transformed into another case of conventional warfare on one side versus a force using the tactics of guerrilla warfare.
In a colonial scenario, the conquering invader has the problem of protecting the borders, carefully screening all incoming travelers, and to this problem is added the problem of quelling a discontented populace. During the long Vietnam war, the number of bombings in government facilities inside the US steadily grew, until it averaged over fifty a week. For the US, a country at war, this was not a threat from without, it was a threat from within. It was this growing threat that led to the National Guardsmen shooting of university students at Kent State.
Once the military forces of a country begin to kill their own peacefully demonstrating citizens, the foreign war is all but lost. It is impossible to maintain an effective foreign fighting force when internal dissent is high. That is because while the home territory can be defended along its borders, at whatever cost in personnel and material, it cannot be defended against its own hostile inhabitants, which effectively becomes a guerrilla force at large within the home area that must also be defended. If the forces required for control of the local opposition to the war are overseas, the internal stability of the conqueror is threatened, and the troops sent to foreign wars must be brought home.
When a war is unpopular, there is the additional problem of dissension within the military ranks. Unpopular orders create resentment, and in active combat it is easy to kill officers who are disliked by the soldiers under them. During the Vietnam war many officers were killed by 'fragging', which was a term used by the troops when a live grenade was rolled into an officer's tent while he was sleeping. An incident of this type has already occurred in the first few days of the Iraq war, and certainly there are reasons why it may often happen again.
An occupying force must hold the territory it has taken, and the troops assigned to this task must receive daily support. The food and other requirements to maintain this support tends to deplete the resources of the troops in the advance forces. Every bit of territory occupied compounds the problem. The territory you own, owns you. If sufficient resources in men and material are not available to protect the lines of supply, the supplies become vulnerable to attack. If essential supplies and the transport equipment necessary to distribute is destroyed or kept from service, the strain on the occupying force can become a serious detriment to their effectiveness in carrying out their duty.
When an attack on the transports of the supply line occurs, additional forces must be assigned the task of protecting the lines of supply. As the supply lines become longer, the same considerations of geometry apply. The roads and surrounding area must be protected, and more and more forces are required for logistics defence as the advance proceeds.
In a war between conventional forces, superior equipment and tactics generally prevail, and this is true even when the occupier faces the zeal of indigenous forces who are entrenched in the defense of their home turf. The local force will be forced to retreat, but if the retreating force gradually transforms itself into a guerrilla force, the superior advantage may evaporate, simply because there is no target worth the cost of firing a missile or artillery shell.
One or a few individuals moving about with light weaponry, such as rifles with telescopic sights or portable rockets, can keep a large conventional force engaged for hours or days, then disappear. Mobile equipment such as tanks and helicopters make good targets for small rockets, which may be launched from the shoulder. Because such light weaponry is easily transported, it can more quickly change its battle venue than a large mechanised force, and it is more easily concealed.
Geometry tends to favor a guerrilla force. A conventional army occupying territory is forced into small concentrated enclaves that are more easily defended than an extended battlefront. These fortified areas then become attractive targets. As previous experience shows, these fortified enclaves are difficult to defend, because the surrounding area is easy to penetrate, and mortars and rockets are not readily defended against.
What geometry tells us, is that the inhabitants of the area being occupied must be made docile. They must be convinced not to actively resist the invading force. If they do resist, and the resistance is a determined one, the force attempting to maintain a continuous presence will be subject to an unremitting terrorist attack, directed to any exposed point and at an opportunistic time. Because a hostile local faction is difficult to identify, eradicate or incarcerate, a guerrilla war inevitably becomes a protracted engagement, with consequent loss of personnel, equipment and morale. Geometrical analysis shows us why guerrilla warfare becomes the seedbed of genocide.
The US strategy is to use armament technology to make "surgical" strikes, expending expensive missiles and bombs to destroy buildings and other infrastructure that offer shelter and support for a guerrilla army. While this tactic is effective in removing the communication and logistical support for a conventional force, it is useless against a guerrilla army, and only accelerates the transition of a conventional army, one that can be overcome, into a guerrilla army than cannot.
The occupying force becomes a captive in its own castles, venturing out from its airfields and bases for a sortie from time to time, prompted by questionable information or political incentive. This operational tactic requires the construction of numerous temporary bases, while offering only limited control, and is aimed at the domination of only the immediately surrounding area. Because total domination and control are seldom possible, these temporary enclaves tend to become permanent. They require manpower and the manpower requires logistical support. They tend to be a continuous expense which lasts until they are either overrun or voluntarily abandoned.
When an invading force recognises that it is in difficulty, it generally summons assistance from allies who are equally ignorant of geometry. When other countries join as allies, their participation invites the attention of the guerrilla opposition. The assisting ally assumes the problems of the invader, and its own military problems are immediately compounded, because a new necessity now arises to defend the borders of the home country against the guerrillas and their allies. It is an instantaneous and unavoidable consequence that is largely unforeseen. Allied participation in an ongoing guerrilla war invites retaliation, in addition to the hostile actions of those factions of their own citizens who oppose the sending of forces abroad.
If the people around the world fail to recognise the important changes that are taking place, the situation will soon devolve into two factions: (1) those countries seen to be supporting the invasion of Iraq, and (2) those countries publicly opposed to the invasion and occupation of Iraq. Because neutrality is now called opposition, there are no neutral countries. Every country that is publicly opposed to the Iraq war is not actively supporting the Iraqi guerrilla fighters, but other countries are willing to provide equipment, though covertly. Countries that provide such aid are motivated not only by a desire for economic gain, but also have a natural desire to bring balance back into the world geopolitical scene.
Arms dealers, who normally do not take sides, provide night goggles, telescopic rifles, portable rocket launchers, and satellite jamming devices to the Iraqi guerrilla forces. These favourite weapons are effective against the mechanical and technological superiority of a modern army. As personnel losses of the war with Iraq increase, and the expense of replacing expensive hardware becomes intolerably burdensome, public zeal for such expeditionary exercises will flag. Time is on the side of the guerrillas, who have negligible expense, and accumulate little debt. Only minimal training is necessary for a guerrilla army, and the supply of human resources is as deep as the population.
If there is a model to examine for its predictive value, Israel serves well. Israel has enormous technological superiority, and the Palestinians have none, yet the fifty year attempt to eliminate and remove the native Palestinian population has failed. By some perverse logic, the US has announced it will solve the Palestinian problem by invading Iraq. In the event, they have only joined Israel in its misery. The Israel-Palestine war, rather than coming to an end, has been enormously broadened, with the US, British and Australians now drawn with the Israeli's into an active war in the Middle East.
For Britain and Australia, the best thing is to bring their troops home, before there is further diplomatic and political damage. For them, there is little to gain and much to lose, including the national honour and international reputation. The US has declared its willingness "to go it alone," without UN approval, in violation of all international agreements, and that is what they should be allowed to do.
It is likely the US economy will collapse before the Iraq war finally ends. If so, the world must prepare itself to make something new and better from the pieces. There is no need to act in haste. The war in the Middle East will be there for a long time. Geometry tells us so.
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